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Non-technical summary
In this paper, we analyse flexibility provisions in multilateral environmental treaties,
such as amendment rules and arbitration procedures, and describe their application in
real world settings. Economic contract theory provides the framework for analysis.
The advantage of flexibility is that treaties can more easily be adapted to changes in
preferences or new scientific knowledge. The disadvantage is that, by introducing
more flexible rules for amendment and re-interpretation, countries risk the loss of
irreversible investments into the treaty relationship. Therefore, they may be reluctant
to enter large-scale international commitments ex ante. The optimal amendment rule
weighs advantages and disadvantages of flexibility in a way that ex-ante utility from
the treaty is maximised. It depends directly on the degree to which the investment into
the contractual relationship is reversible.
In our exploratory empirical analysis, we look at 400 multilateral treaties and
supplementary texts from the area of international environmental politics. We note that
there are remarkable differences in the provisions for adoption and entry into force of
amendments, as well as in the rules for third-party arbitration. Using correspondence
analysis, we show that these institutional arrangements can be represented in two
dimensions. One is the degree of explicit institutionalisation, the other is the degree of
flexibility in collective decision making. Furthermore, it is shown that flexibility rules
complement each other. Treaties which have more flexible amendment rules are also
more likely to have binding arbitration procedures. This parallels the “checks and
balances” applied within nations and suggests that constitution designers care for
“bounded flexibility” at the international level.
There is clear evidence that the inclusion of certain provisions has changed over
time. While the degree of institutionalisation rises over time, treaties have become
successively less flexible since the 1970s. This phenomenon accords well with our
contract theoretical treatment of amendment procedures. If treaty obligations to
member states have become more substantial during the last couple of decades, and
obligations entailed that irreversible decisions had to be made, then countries should
indeed have become more anxious to protect these irreversible investments. However,
a precise statistical test of our hypotheses is left to further research.
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Abstract
In international politics, intergovernmental treaties provide the rules of the game.
Similar to private law, treaty designers face a trade-off between flexibility to adjust to
unforeseen contingencies and the danger that the binding nature of the treaty and
hence, the level of commitment by treaty members, is being undermined if the treaty
can be amended too easily. In this paper, we address this problem in the analytical
framework of institutional economics, drawing in particular on the incomplete
contracts literature. Furthermore, we derive preliminary hypotheses and operational
concepts for the measurement of flexibility in international treaties. Based on 400
treaties and supplementary agreements from the field of international environmental
law, we provide new insights into the combined application of rules for adoption and
entry into force of amendments, as well as provisions for conflict resolution and
interpretative development. Using correspondence analysis, we show that treaty
provisions can be represented in a two-dimensional property space, where treaties can
be arrayed according to the degree of institutionalisation as well as along a flexibility
dimension.
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11 Introduction
In international politics, intergovernmental treaties provide the rules of the game.
Treaties form the constitutions of international relations between the governments
committed to them. Like national constitutions, intergovernmental treaties contain only
global goals. They constitute frameworks within which concrete solutions can be
embedded. An inherent attribute of constitution-building is to declare a consensus on
broader goals and to maintain vagueness in order to allow member states to react
flexibly in case of changing circumstances. Therefore, intergovernmental treaties never
fully specify all the options open to members up to the implementation of operative
policies, but include a degree of flexibility through possible modification and re-
interpretation of the treaty.
At the centre of this paper are the procedures by which existing treaties can be
amended. While a legal basis for amendment and modification is provided by
customary law, as well as by the 1972 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
many treaties contain their own rules by which amendments are facilitated, such as
majority decision-making. Moreover, subordinate texts to the treaties such as technical
annexes or protocols are often subject to different, and easier, amendment rules.
Indeed, numerous institutional innovations have emerged in international law, such as
framework conventions which formulate only the common interest of the contracting
parties, with concrete obligations being developed (and codified) continuously in
further negotiation rounds.
Another way of introducing flexibility into international treaties is to formulate them
vaguely, but to allow for binding interpretation by dispute settlement bodies as a way
of filling the gaps and opening the door for successive development of the treaty
(Cooter, 2000, Stone Sweet, 1998, 2000, Vanberg, 1998). The line between treaty
development by judicial interpretation and formal amendment is thin.1 In this paper, we
use the existence of dispute settlement procedures as an indicator for the importance of
change by interpretation. As Stone Sweet notes, the implementation of third-party
dispute resolution mechanism constitutes one, often privileged mechanism of adapting
rule systems to the needs and purpose of live under them (Stone Sweet, 2000:
Preface). Many of these mechanisms will never actually be applied. Nevertheless, their
                                                
1 The separation between an ... authentic interpretation and a treaty amendment is sometimes
problematic (Ipsen, 1999: 115, translation by the authors). For a similar statement, see
Amerasinghe (1996: 417).
2mere presence may have a strategic impact on actors behaviour (Chasek, 2001: 237)
and it is, therefore, likely that they are chosen consciously. Ex ante, it is unclear
whether arbitration provides an alternative to explicit treaty amendment or whether
both ways of including flexibility complement each other. Therefore, both should be
looked at in conjunction.
The possibility of amending or re-interpreting a treaty serves to adjust its contents to
changing circumstances. However, the fact that a treaty may be renegotiated in the
future also gives rise to possible strategic behaviour by governments. In the economic
literature, these incentives have been discussed in incomplete contracts literature (for a
survey, see Tirole, 1999).2 Technically, an incomplete contract does not include all
relevant information available at the time when it is concluded.3 For instance, a treaty
may not specify contractual consequences for all future contingencies. The result is
that the parties may, at some stage, wish to renegotiate the contract. In reality,
international treaties are incomplete contracts for a number of reasons. They often
specify the obligations of the member states only vaguely, such that it is difficult to
assess whether a state is complying with its treaty obligations. Moreover, no clear
consequences are stated for many contingencies.
The main problem with contractual incompleteness is that the possibility of future
renegotiation may provide an obstacle for the parties to invest in the contractual
relationship, because these investments may be a disadvantage at the bargaining table
when the treaty is being amended. The argument rests on the assumption that some
decisions made in compliance with the treaty are irreversible, such that the costs of
compliance cannot be recovered at later stages. We argue that many multilateral
agreements, and in particular international environmental treaties, are characterised by
the irreversibility of investment decisions.
                                                
2 Other important areas of economic contract theory are the principal-and-agent theory, the theory
of moral hazard and the theory of incentive-compatible contracts.
3 In the legal literature, the definition of contractual incompleteness is distinct from its use in
economics. For lawyers, the crucial point is whether or not the contract contains gaps in its rules,
such that the conditions under which the contract obliges the actors to certain actions are not
completely specified. A contract is said to be complete if the list of conditions on which the
actions are based is exhaustive, that is, if the contract provides explicitly for all possible
conditions. Otherwise, a contract will be referred to as incomplete (Shavell, 1998:436). From an
economic perspective, by contrast, Pareto optimality is a decisive criterion for complete contracts.
Even contracts which specify for each state of the world an action to be taken can be incomplete,
if the parties have ex post an incentive to renegotiate the contract.
3Recently, Koremenos (2001a, 2001b) has discussed provisions for renegotiation in the
framework of an analytical model in the incomplete contracts tradition. She is mainly
concerned with the choice of treaties with fixed or indefinite duration. In the case of
finite duration, renegotiations on the prolongation of the treaty take place. Otherwise,
there are no renegotiations. Koremenos introduces costs of renegotiation, such as costs
of organising a meeting, opportunity costs from wasting time in negotiations and the
like, as a reason why treaties are not always concluded for a fixed duration. However,
Koremenos does not deal with amendment provisions, such as majorities required for
adoption or provisions for entry into force.
First, we discuss the requirements of international law concerning the amendment and
interpretation of treaties. In the third section, we analyse the costs and benefits of
flexibility and discuss different amendment rules from an economic point of view. In
the empirical part of the paper, we investigate how amendment rules and third-party
arbitration by tribunals are configured in practice, using a data set of 400 multilateral
environmental treaties and supplementary agreements. Similar to Koremenos (2001b),
we code amendment procedures of existing treaties into a number of categories.4 A
descriptive analysis shows that there is wide variation in the use of amendment
provisions and their combinations applied. Moreover, the joint design of different
provisions for flexibility in real treaties seem to reinforce each other. We also note that
procedures granting greater flexibility are used less frequently in more recent times.
Our explanation for this development is that treaties concluded more recently require
more irreversible decisions to be made. Hence, treaty-makers were anxious to protect
these irreversible investments by choosing less flexible amendment rules.
2 The Legal Analysis of Renegotiation Procedures
2.1 Legal sources of amendment rules
In international law, treaties are the central legal basis for the commitment of states.5
Standard textbooks of international law such as Ipsen (1999), Bowett (1982), and
                                                
4 Chasek (2001) also codes amendment procedures as part of her strength index but uses only 10
treaties as empirical basis.
5 For a critical assessment of the role of international treaties in the context of international law-
making, see  Haffner (1999: 132, translated by the authors): The explicit formulation of law
norms has advantages as well as disadvantages as compared to non-written norms. Advantages,
4Shermers and Blokker (1995) often contain sections on treaty amendment and
definitions of the relevant concepts. A starting point are the provisions of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. According to Article 39 of the
Convention, treaties can be amended by the contracting parties. Unless the treaty
provides otherwise, the rules for amendment are the same as the rules for conclusion
and entry into force of the original treaty. This means that, apart from treaties adopted
at international conferences, amendments are subject to the consent of all contracting
parties. In particular, no state can be bound by an amendment to which it has not given
its consent (Article 40).
The amendment of a treaty has to be distinguished from a modification as stipulated by
Article 41 of the Vienna Convention. Modification means the changing of particular
treaty provisions or even of the whole treaty as agreed upon by a subset of the
members, thereby defining only the relationships between subsets of members, so
called inter-se-agreements, whereas amendments designate a changing of the treaty
by all its members (Ipsen, 1999: 136, translated by the authors). There are a number
of conditions connected to treaty modifications which do not apply in the case of treaty
amendment. In particular, the position of non-members to inter-se agreements must not
be called in question. The requirement is that the modification does not affect the
enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of
their obligations (Article 41.1 (b) (i) of the Vienna Convention). Therefore,
amendments adopted and ratified by a majority but not all member states (if the treaty
allows for it) are to be distinguished from modifications. In reality, however, this
distinction may often be unclear (Ipsen, 1999: 136f.).
With reference to constitutional treaties (i.e. treaties setting up an international
organisation or an international regime), Amerasinghe (1996) points out that the
application of Article 40 would be particularly problematic if only a subset of the
original treaty members declare themselves bound by an amendment:
In the case of a constitution of an international organization, the constitution
would be unworkable, if some amended provisions applied as between group of
                                                                                                                                                        
because it systematises and integrates existing law, guaranteeing awareness of the norm better
verifiability, which results in the prevention of conflicts. As a consequence, states have larger
influence in the ongoing active design of international treaties as compared to international
common law. ... Disadvantages of codification arise from the fixation of the law at a given point
of time, which prevents the dynamic flexibility necessary for adjustment to new conditions.
5members, while conflicting amendment provisions as between another group of
members or as between the two groups(Amerasinghe, 1996: 410).6
He resolves this problem as follows:
Short of concluding that constitutions cannot be amended unless specific
provision for their amendment has been made, it may be suggested either that
amendment is only possible if all the members agree to the amendment  a
principle conferring a veto on very single member  or that, while amendment
may be possible by agreement among a simple or other majority, those members
who refuse to agree to the amendment either cease to be members or must act as
if bound by the amendment (Amerasinghe, 1996: 411).
The latter possibility, however, would be incompatible with the consensus principle
inherent in the Vienna Convention, since a group of treaty members could confront the
minority with a take it or leave it-threat not foreseen at the time the original treaty
was concluded.
A further distinction is sometimes made between amendment and revision. If only
parts of an existing treaty are changed, the term amendment is now accepted,
whereas the substantial and encompassing change of a treaty is usually termed as a
treaty revision (Ipsen, 1999: 136). Nevertheless, since it is difficult in practice to
draw a clear line between amendment and revision, the Vienna Convention only uses
the term amendment.
As the development of the treaty by ongoing interpretation is concerned, article 31 of
the Vienna Convention refers explicitly to the interpretation of treaties, but is silent as
to the interpretation of treaties by arbitration tribunals or other international
institutions. Article 66 (a) provides for two different ways of dispute resolution:
arbitration (which requires the consent of the parties) and the invocation of the
International Court of Justice. Concerning the application of Part V of the Vienna
Convention itself, Article 66 (b) provides for a conciliation commission which may
issue a non-binding recommendation for the settlement of disputes between contracting
parties. However, there are many more institutional varieties when we look at the
provisions of individual treaties.7
                                                
6 These difficulties are reflected in the discussion on enhanced cooperation and flexibility in
European Community Law.
7 For an overview cf. Ipsen (1999: 1021ff.), especially para. 27.
62.2 Amendment procedures in international treaties
If a treaty does not contain explicit procedures for amendment, the provisions of the
Vienna Convention provide the rules (Article 40). In this sense, the Convention
provides the default rules for treaty amendment. However, as our empirical analysis
will show, many multilateral treaties deviate from the rules of the Vienna Convention.
Despite the existence of a series of case studies (Schwelb, 1954, Zacklin, 1968, Gold,
1973, Bowman, 1995), little work on these provisions has been done and no general
conclusions can be drawn. Only Amerasinghes (1996: 405-423) study on
constitutional treaties provides a systematic presentation and preliminary typology of
amendment provisions and their application to real world settings. According to
Amerasinghe, most international treaties of constitutional character have provisions for
their adjustment. Exceptions are the OECD, the International Telecommunications
Union, and the NATO (Amerasinghe, 1996: 406). Some treaties require the investiture
of an intergovernmental conference. For instance, the founding treaties of the
European Communities require that amendments be adopted by unanimous agreement
at an intergovernmental conference, which itself is initiated by a two-thirds majority of
member states.8 Others stipulate less formal different amendment procedures. Overall,
the variety of arrangements and combinations of arrangements appears to be
overwhelming.
In a second step, Amerasinghe classifies amendment provisions according to several
aspects. One of them is the substance of the amendment. Another is the majority
required for the adoption of amendments as well as the provisions for their entry into
force (Amerasinghe, 1996: 409). In this context, he distinguishes between a one-step
and a two-step procedure for amendment as well as between the consensus versus the
majority principle (Amerasinghe, 1996: 412):
A one step procedure involves adoption of the amendment by an organ of the
institution, normally the plenary organ (general congress), which adoption is
sufficient to bring the amendment into effect for all members, nothing further
being required. The two-step procedure, by contrast, requires, first, that action
be taken within the institution by a vote of adoption of the amendment by an
organ, generally the plenary or general congress, and second, that the amendment
be ratified or accepted by some or all of the member States, before the
amendment comes into effect. (Amerasinghe, 1996: 412).
                                                
8 Article 96 of the ECSC, Article 236 of the EEC treaty, Article 204 of the Euratom Treaty.
7The one-step or two-step procedures can be applied to different subjects within the
same treaty, for instance for the constitutional and the operative parts of the treaty.
Which of the procedures is finally chosen also depends, Amerasinghe (1996: 413f.)
argues, on whether the majority principle is employed (see below section 3.2).
Amerasinghe also notes differences in the provisions concerning members dissenting
with the amendment. Several treaties stipulate that dissenting members must cease to
be members of the treaty as amended. Thus Article 26 of the Covenant of the League
of Nations stipulated that  those who dissented from amendments once they came into
effect ceased to be members of the League of Nations (Amerasinghe, 1996: 411).
Alternatively, dissenting members can be allowed to withdraw voluntarily.
Beside the formal change of treaty provisions, Amerasinghe also covers other
flexibility devices. One of these is the variation of a treaty, which allows
international organisations to adapt a treaty short of formal amendment. This is used,
for instance, to increase funding to the organisation (Amerasinghe, 1996: 417 ff.).
Another way of introducing flexibility is by changing the interpretation of the treaty:
Interpretation of constitutional text may result in a departure from the natural and
ordinary meaning of texts.  There is a point at which developing a text may result in
such change that it amounts to amendment rather than interpretation (1996: 417), or,
even stronger, The distinction between amendment and interpretation, however,
becomes blurred, where practice changes the text of a constitution (1996: 418).
Accordingly, the presence of institutions such as arbitral tribunals or conciliation
commissions which structure and institutionalise the process of ongoing interpretation
of the meaning of the treaty may be as important an indicator for treaty flexibility as
the provisions for formal amendment. 9
Despite providing interesting and new insights, Amerasinghes typology and his
analytical conclusions are, in our view, preliminary and tentative. In particular, the
stages within the process of amendment, such as initiation, adoption, possible
ratification by treaty members and, finally, the legal entry into force should be
distinguished more systematically, since the overall flexibility of the treaty is jointly
determined by the combination of the provisions on all these stages. Furthermore, the
empirical identification of typical combinations of flexibility provisions, such as
                                                
9 For the discretionary power of  constitutional courts in situations of conflicts between separated
powers and in cases of constitutional interpretation under given amendment procedures, cf.
Cooter (2000: 225-234).
8majority requirements, requirements for entry into force, and the presence of
institutions for conciliation and arbitration, is a prerequisite of a positive theory of a
flexible adaptive institution-building.10 Based on a theory-guided compilation of
empirical facts, results may show that contrary to mainstream convictions in
international law as well as in international relations theory in political science there is
not necessarily a linear trend of institutionalisation of international law, but the
emergence of complex patterns of checks and balances.
3 The Choice of Flexibility Provisions: A Contract Theoretic View
In the first part of this section, we discuss the costs and benefits of treaty flexibility,
without considering particular institutions or rules. Since the benefits from flexibility
are, to a degree, less problematic to deal with, we concentrate on the costs which arise
from more flexible treaties. In the second part, we analyse the instruments by which
flexibility is actually achieved in international treaties and discuss their interaction.
3.1 Costs and benefits of flexibility
In this section, we discuss costs and benefits of flexibility. By flexibility we mean the
easiness of changing the contractual obligations under which the parties operate. The
benefits of flexibility consist in gains that arise if a treaty can be adapted more easily to
changing circumstances. Renegotiation of the treaty may result in the treaty better
fulfilling its original purpose  for instance, if new scientific knowledge about the
consequences of certain policies has emerged since the time when an international
treaty had been concluded.11 In this case, renegotiation may result in Pareto
improvements from the point of view of the contracting parties. Renegotiation may
also prevent the danger of the treaty becoming obsolete or even counter-productive,
such that the contracting parties tacitly agree to suspend it. It keeps the treaty members
within the boundary of the treaty and makes defection from the treaty less likely (Ress,
                                                
10 It should be recalled that Amerasinghe deals only with adoption and entry into force. Many other
facets of treaty are not covered in his analysis. This applies, for instance, to institutions for
conflict resolution or the possibility of adding protocols and annexes, opening the door to
exceptions and refinement without touching the overarching objective of the treaty.
11 Another advantage of flexibility, from the point of view of the individual negotiator, is that it
allows for future changes in preferences (Kreps, 1979). However, in a political context
negotiators may also have the desire to bind future decision-makers from their own countries in
order to prevent the negotiation outcome from being reversed.
91994: 290).12 Skilfully designed institutions for renegotiation may induce countries, in
the terminology of Hirschman (1970), to voice their objections rather than exit from
the treaty. Therefore, less restrictive amendment rules or other flexibility devices may
be beneficial.
The costs of flexibility are more difficult to assess. Koremenos (2001a, 2001b) restricts
her discussion to costs that arise directly from negotiating amendments. There is no
doubt that negotiation costs can be considerable in international treaty systems.
However, in our view costs of flexibility are also due to strategic effects, arising from
the fact that the binding nature of the treaty and hence, the level of commitment by
treaty members, is being undermined if the treaty can be amended too easily. This may
lead to less-than-fully-efficient solutions to the underlying economic problem the treaty
is meant to solve. The traditional economic law conception of contracts accentuated its
function for allowing and securing market exchange. In this view, the most important
economic role of contracts is to guarantee the observance of promises. Modern
economic approaches, by contrast, highlight the incentives resulting from contracts
within different contextual conditions, concerning in particular the distribution of
information. On this basis, the question of efficiency  in the sense of the Pareto
principle  of contract design is central.
The effect of contract renegotiation on efficiency has been noticed in the scholarly
literature  in the context of private law. Jolls (1997) discusses the function of contracts
as devices of bilateral (rather than individual) commitment. She argues that under
certain circumstances  she deals specifically with moral hazard and time-varying
preferences, but there may be more  a bilateral commitment not to renegotiate a
contract may lead to Pareto improvements ex ante (i.e., at the time when the contract is
concluded), although renegotiation clearly must be welfare-improving ex post. Her
argument is particularly relevant for international law, because as in common law, an
agreement not to renegotiate a treaty cannot be legally enforced if all parties agree to
renegotiation.13
                                                
12 Concerning a related problem, the flexibility of constitutions, a similar point is made by
Giovannoni (2001), who considers the benefits and costs of different amendment rules to provide
a stable constitution. If amendment is too easy, then the constitution loses its attractiveness. If
amendment is too rigidly regulated, then actors in favour of amendments will look for other ways
to change the constitution (e.g. revolutions).
13 Indeed, international law is mainly composed of customary law and, thus, has a structure similar
to common law (Ress, 1994: 280). Comparing the general notion of contract with the concept of
treaty in international law, one recognises a striking analogy. In both cases, transactions between
10
The theoretical problem has been dealt with more formally in the incomplete
contracting literature. In our view, there are two main problems arising from treaties as
incomplete contracts and the incentive to renegotiate contracts. The first is the well-
known hold-up problem, which may arise whenever treaties are renegotiated. The
second is limited to particularly flexible amendment rules, such as majority decision-
making. If negotiators are risk-averse, they have an incentive to under-invest in the
contractual relationship, for fear of being in a minority position at the renegotiation
stage even if the hold-up problem is not present.
The hold-up problem has been discussed, among others, by Grout (1984), Hart and
Moore (1988), Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), and Williamson (1985).14 In this
literature, it is assumed that making a contract work requires parties to invest in the
contracting relationship. The important point is that these investments are irreversible
in the sense that costs cannot be recovered if the treaty is abandoned, i.e. these
investments cause sunk costs. Although the hold-up problem inherent in the
renegotiation of contracts has often been analysed in the framework of bilateral
exchange relationships between the seller and the buyer of a good, it carries over to a
multilateral context as is characteristic for international treaties (Hart and Moore, 1990,
Rogerson, 1992). Another important assumption is the absence of a court which
observes all the relevant circumstances and, based on this knowledge, imposes a
contractually specified solution.
The incentive problem derives from the fact that states which invest heavily in the
contracting relationship are always in the danger of being exploited at subsequent
renegotiations, because their bargaining position has weakened. Parties which have
invested comparatively little may threaten to leave the treaty unilaterally or to stop
complying with it, demanding concessions as a price for maintaining the treaty
relationship. The hold-up problem arises through non-formal withdrawal from the
treaty, which remains an option for the member due to problems of non-verifiability
and, in our case, the lack of enforcement at the international level. Therefore, a low
level of commitment seems to be preferable in terms of each partys individual
rationality. The hold-up problem could be avoided if all contracting parties made a
long-run commitment not to renegotiate the treaty (or to limit renegotiation to certain
                                                                                                                                                        
actors have to be protected by binding agreements. The difference is that the observance of these
agreements cannot be guaranteed and enforced by the state or another superior authority.
However, despite the lack of enforcing institutions (and perhaps even the lack of reciprocity
relations), they assign credibility and legal commitment to the declarations of states.
14 A useful survey of the literature is contained in Schmitz (2001).
11
precisely defined circumstances). It could also be avoided if the contracting parties
could contract over the degree of compliance and investment, such that the level of
compliance could be made a mutually recognisable condition in the renegotiation
procedure. However, in the case of international relations it seems clear that none of
these theoretical possibilities can be implemented.15
Some authors have suggested that the hold-up problem can be remedied by including
restrictive rules for the renegotiation process into the treatys governance structure.
Aghion et al. (1994) show, for the case of a seller-buyer-relationship, that relationship-
specific investments may reach the efficient level if the parties to the contract commit
ex ante to a certain renegotiation design. The renegotiation design which achieves this
entails an asymmetric distribution of bargaining power in the case of renegotiation: all
bargaining power is given to one party. Second, the default solution (in terms of
quantities traded) is fixed for the case that renegotiations lead to an impasse. As
Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995) show, it may be sufficient that a court can enforce trade
of the default quantity, given that the court can observe which party is in breach of the
original contract.  In international relations, however, a commitment to this kind of
renegotiation design seems hardly feasible. In particular, the enforcement of a default
solution in the absence of agreement over amendment is not incorporated in the law of
treaties. Due to the sovereignty of states, the non-compliance of a state with its
obligations can only be sanctioned by suspending treaty relationships with that state.
The only feasible default solution is, therefore, the no trade situation. Moreover, it is
unclear whether the solution to the renegotiation problem proposed by Aghion et al.
(1994) and Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995) carries over to the multilateral context.
To our knowledge, the inclusion of more (rather than less) flexible rules than
unanimous decision-making for renegotiation, such as majority rules for the adoption
of amendments, has not been discussed in the hold-up literature. However, it seems
likely that less restrictive procedures, by increasing the chances for successful
renegotiation, exacerbate the incentive problem. The problem here is that a party which
threatens to leave the treaty or stop complying with it unless the other parties make
concessions can play off different groups of members in the renegotiation process.
This increases its bargaining power once renegotiations have started. As a
                                                
15 First, there is no international court which could prevent the amendment of a treaty if all of the
contracting parties agree to it. Second, the level of compliance and investment in the treaty
relationship could hardly be verified by such a court. For instance, there is often no clear
assessment of the costs and benefits to industry and consumers from the introduction of new,
environmentally-friendly technology.
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consequence, members which have made large-scale investments into the treaty face an
even greater risk of being exploited than under unanimous decision-making. This
provides a further disincentive to invest in the treaty relationship.
The second  and related  problem of flexible amendment rules besides the hold-up
problem is also likely to affect the willingness of states to incur sunk investment costs.
If amendments can be adopted by majority rule, member states may find themselves in
a minority position at the renegotiation stage, hence their returns to the initial
irreversible investments may be nullified. The higher the individual initial investment,
the greater the amount of resources at the mercy of a majority coalition. Therefore,
even if bargaining power at the renegotiation stage is not influenced by the amount of
initial investment (as in the hold-up problem), partners to the contract may have a
disincentive to invest.16 While the hold-up problem also exists under risk neutrality,
risk aversion is required for the second argument to be valid as a reason for under-
investment. At the constitutional stage where choices over decision rules are made,
risk-averse governments, therefore, have a reason to insist on consensus or unanimity
if substantial sunk costs are involved.
The existence of sunk costs from compliance with a treaty is crucial for the relevance
of both of these arguments. Since international treaties deal with a wide variety of
different subjects, a general assessment as to the degree of sunkness of the
investment cannot be given. However, the presence of sunk costs is often evident in
international environmental treaties which form the basis of our empirical
investigation. An interesting example, mentioned by Raustiala (2001: 480ff), is the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil of 1954
(OILPOL), superseded in 1973 by the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). The main instrument of the 1954 treaty was to put
limits on the discharge of oil by ocean-going tankers. By contrast, the MARPOL
convention introduced certain minimum standards on the equipment of tankers, in
particular the requirement for segregated ballast tanks such that ballast water is no
longer carried in, and discharged from, cargo oil tanks. The requirement of the
OILPOL convention did not necessarily give rise to sunk costs, because it left open
how the reduction was to be achieved. By contrast, the provisions of the MARPOL
convention require shipowners to equip new tankers with costly new technology.
Shipowners cannot recover these costs in case the convention is withdrawn.
                                                
16 A model showing this result formally is available from the authors on request.
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In general, international environmental treaties cause sunk costs if they induce
polluters to apply new technological measures in the production process in order to
reduce the emission of harmful substances, to change the specification of products or
to abandon the production of certain products altogether. Other treaties, such as those
which restrict maritime fishing activities or limit the economic exploitation of
Antarctica or the moon, regulate the use of a common resource. This influences
economic decisions over which capacities to hold. Decisions on capacities  such as a
reduction of tonnage in the fishing industry  regularly lead to sunk costs, because new
physical capital is built up or old production facilities are dumped.
It is reasonable to assume that states take care that the benefits resulting from the
adjustment of production technology by all contracting parties will not be dissipated by
subsequent renegotiations of the treaty. If there were no sunk costs, the amendment of
treaties would be far less problematic because the strategic incentive to under-invest in
the contractual relationship would not be present.
On the basis of this argument, we expect that renegotiation rules are more restrictive if
sunk costs are more important. While this proposition cannot be tested empirically with
our data, two of its implications are testable. First, given that there are explicit
flexibility provisions within additional supplementary texts (like protocols, appendixes
or annexes) to the treaties, we expect that treaty members more often agree in these
supplementary texts on less restrictive (less-than-unanimity) amendment rules. We
expect such texts being more focused on specific application areas of the original
treaty, implying smaller risks of irreversible investments. Second, given that the
obligations specified in international environmental agreements become more specific
over time, we expect that treaties adopted later have less flexible amendment
procedures.17
3.2. Institutional options in detail
In this section, we discuss actual amendment procedures and how individual provisions
are combined in order to produce the overall flexibility of treaty obligations. Such a
discussion is necessary because flexibility is a theoretical concept that cannot be
directly observed from the treaty texts. Rather, flexibility arises through the
                                                
17 However, within existing treaty systems there may be a countervailing effect: Due to the build-up
of trust between the contracting parties, the possibility of strategic opportunism by others is
perceived as less of a threat in later than in earlier periods of negotiation.
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combination of different provisions concerning, in particular, the duration of the treaty,
the procedures for adoption and entry into force, and the possibility of non-contractual
variation of member states obligations through the application of arbitration
procedures. These alternative designs are part of the contractual governance structure
which describes the possible actions of the parties in the long-run.
There is a variety of provisions which may influence flexibility. The most important
ones are the following:
• A fixed duration of the treaty influences flexibility because the contracting parties
have to become active in order to extend the duration at the expiry of the treaty
(Koremenos, 2001a). At this point, some of the contracting parties may demand
changes to the contents of the treaty, threatening not to participate in the
prolongation of the treaty if their demands are not met.
• Some treaties are unlimited, but contain explicit dates for revision conferences.
Although this does not preclude amendments to be negotiated outside the revision
conferences, it makes renegotiation more likely, since some of the obstacles to
renegotiation, such as bringing states representatives to agree to a date and a place
for renegotiation, are removed.
• Adoption and entry into force of amendments follow a diversity of rules. The least
flexible approach is to require unanimity of adoption and formal ratification by all
contracting parties. More flexible rules are majority voting at the adoption stage
and less formal procedures for entry into force or the one-step procedure as
described by Amerasinghe (1996).
• Treaties differ in the way non-ratifiers of amendments are treated. Two different
provisions can be distinguished. First, non-ratifiers remain bound to the original
version of the treaty. This is also the procedure contained in the Vienna
Convention. Second, there may be provisions such that non-ratifiers cease to be
parties to the treaty. The latter provision clearly provides an incentive to accept the
amendment as long as the net benefit from being a member of the treaty are still
positive.
• Concerning changes to the obligations by interpretation of the treaty, there may be
provisions for bodies which arbitrate between contracting parties in case of
conflict. In order to provide for non-violent dispute resolution in case of conflicts
about the meaning of the original constitution, treaty members can unanimously ex-
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ante commit to accept the judgement of independent third parties. One may
distinguish bodies which can issue binding decisions to the parties to a dispute and
those which can only give recommendations.
• In some treaties, there are explicit opt-out provisions which allow countries to be
exempt from certain obligations. This may facilitate change. There may also be
indirect effects on flexibility by rules on accession to, and withdrawal from, the
treaty.
Within these categories, there will often be an intuitive ordering of more or less
flexible provisions. For instance, treaties with limited duration are more flexible than
those with infinite duration, treaties which specify a date for a review conference are
more flexible than treaties which do not, treaties which can be amended by qualified
majority are more flexible than those which can be amended only by unanimity.
Sometimes, however, the institutional provisions cannot be clearly ordered. For
instance, does a provision according to which amendments enter into force upon
ratification by a two-thirds majority grant more or less flexibility than a treaty which
allows for automatic entry into force of amendments unless a quarter of treaty
members object?
Second, we may also have conjectures concerning the comparison of flexibility across
each of the categories. For instance, the requirement that all treaty members must ratify
an amendment seems to be even more restrictive than the requirement of unanimity at
the adoption stage. This is because ratification often involves additional actors at the
national level, in particular if ratification requires parliaments assent (the US being a
prominent example in this context).
Third, flexibility is produced by combinations of different amendment procedures.
Rational decision-makers may not combine treaty provisions which counteract each
other. For instance, if the majority rule at the adoption stage were combined with a
unanimous ratification requirement, this would lead to the adoption of many
amendments which are never actually implemented. In tendency, one would expect the
degree of flexibility inherent in individual treaty provisions to complement each other.
The choice of amendment provisions and particular combinations thereof may also be
influenced by considerations which are not related to flexibility. An important
motivation may be to reduce the costs of renegotiation. By initiating parliamentary
procedures, a formal ratification requirement puts a burden on the member states
legislative systems. Therefore, negotiators may prefer to choose the one-step procedure
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for treaty amendment. By contrast, where negotiation costs are expected to be low  in
particular, in regional treaties with only a limited number of members  negotiators
may have little reason to introduce provisions which make negotiating agreements less
costly. Another aspect is that the economic character of the good provided by the treaty
may render certain provisions counter-productive. For instance, if the good provided
by the treaty is a non-excludable public good, the provision that members not accepting
the amendment must leave the treaty is unlikely to be applied, because it would give
members a further reason for free-riding.
At the constitutional level, negotiators may also avoid certain combinations of
flexibility provisions. An interesting example is Amerasinghes conjecture that
majority decision-making is empirically correlated with explicit ratification
requirements (see table 1). While Amerasinghe provides no arguments for his
conjecture, a plausible rationale may proceed along the following lines. The possibility
of modifying a treaty by majority rule implies that the original members commit ex
ante to be  at least potentially  forced to accept amendments which have negative
externalities on the minority coalition. Since the unanimity status quo ensures each
member its full property rights, such a decision entails the risk of a loss of autonomy
and self-determination of an actor and therefore a change of regime from a set of actors
with full autonomy to a set of actors with reduced and enhanced autonomy,
respectively. Under incomplete information and once members have accepted the risk
of majority-based renegotiation, members have a preference to make sure that
amendments are actually implemented. This implementation occurs formally by
ratification, and practically by complying members. Thus, rather than making
renegotiation more difficult, a formal ratification requirement may also serve as a
device to make sure which contractual obligations (those of the amended treaty or
those of the original treaty) apply to each of the parties and commit members to the
implementation of the amendments.
Table 1: Amerasinghe’s Conjecture
Procedure for entry into force




Concerning another example, the interaction between explicit amendment and dispute
resolution, one would expect that the presence of strong third party conflict resolution
mechanisms coincides with the possibility to amend the treaty with less than
unanimity. There are two reasons for this. On the one hand, if amendments can be
made by majority, countries may wish to introduce an institutional actor having the
power to review amendments and to mediate in the case where a majority has caused
negative externalities to the original treaty members. Arbitration, then, genuinely
constitutes a flexibility provision on its own by transferring these institutions the right
of interpretation, and it is linked to another flexibility device, namely majority voting.
On the other hand, given that the discretionary leeway of these bodies is limited by the
size of the Pareto set of the conflicting parties,18 and the Pareto set is the larger the
greater the majority required for changes, unanimity may endow tribunals and
commissions with more power than desired by states. Therefore, actors establishing
such provisions simultaneously have an interest to confine the power of such tribunals,
... lowering the obstacles to change the constitution, such as requiring a simple
majority instead of a supramajority, decreases the discretionary power of the courts to
interpret the constitution (Cooter, 2000: 232).
This discussion of possible interaction effects in the choice of amendment provisions is
certainly not exhaustive. However, we now turn to the empirical evidence concerning
which amendment provisions (and combinations of them) are actually chosen in real-
world treaty systems.
4 Empirical analysis of flexibility provisions
In this section, we present a descriptive data analysis of flexibility provisions in
multilateral environmental treaties. Given that there have been no previous empirical
studies on the subject, we restrict ourselves to simple description and bivariate testing
of hypotheses. The questions driving the exploratory data analysis are the following:
• What is the proportion of multilateral environmental treaties actually having
flexibility provisions? Are there different provisions within treaty systems, such as
differences between the main text and treaty annexes?
                                                
18 For the setting of separated powers systems cf. Cooter (2000: 225).
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• How is flexibility achieved and which of the institutional variants, such as
provisions concerning duration, adoption, ratification, third party conflict
resolution, accessibility, are empirically identifiable?
• Which combinations are typically used? Which combinations do not occur? Are
combinations of provisions for adoption, entry into force and dispute resolution etc.
obviously chosen in order to reinforce each other or do they thwart each other? Can
we detect a latent joint pattern behind the combination of flexibility provisions?
• Do supplementary texts have more flexible provisions for renegotiation than main
treaty texts?
• Are there changes in flexibility over time?
For the reason discussed in the last section, we concentrate on environmental treaties in
the empirical analysis. The data set includes only multilateral treaties. Our strategy is to
sample all important environmental treaties, because these are most likely to involve
economic costs. In judging whether a treaty is important, we rely on experts
judgements. The criterion is inclusion of the treaty in the collection of Burhenne (n.d.).
Burhenne groups treaties into a number of subject categories. Since the number of
treaties in the Burhenne collection is very large, we restricted the sample to the
following subject categories which form the core of international environmental
concerns: air; atmosphere, climate and outer space; environmental conservation
(general); hazardous substances; natural resources and nature conservation; non
renewable resources and mining; seawater quality and pollution; and water quality and
pollution. These represent eight of a total of 35 subject categories.19 Many treaties,
however, are classified in more than one subject grouping. Therefore, most
overarching environmental treaties dealing with more than one environmental problem
are represented in our data.
We use all treaties contained in these subject groups from Burhennes treaty collection,
as well as all supplementary agreements such as protocols, annexes or appendices.
Clearly, our sample is not meant to be representative for the universe of environmental
treaties, let alone for all international agreements. The number of treaty texts in our
sample is 400. Of these, all but 35 texts are obtained from internet sources and are thus
                                                
19 However, many of the subject categories not used in the sample contain only very few treaties.
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machine readable. The others are taken from the United Nations Treaty Collection
(UNTS) or, in case they are not included there, directly from the Burhenne collection.
An entry in the data set consists of a text or supplementary text which is subject to a
certain amendment procedure. That means that texts are not classified according to the
provisions they contain, but according to the provisions by which they are affected.
Thus, if the amendment procedure of an appendix to a treaty is contained in the main
text of the treaty, information is taken from the main text. In 13 cases, parts of a text
were subject to a different amendment procedure than other parts of the treaty. In this
case, parts with different procedures form separate entries in the data set.
Given that the data base consists of treaties, protocols, annexes and the like, there is a
hierarchy of texts. Of all texts, 102 are separate treaties and 298 are supplementary
texts to these treaties. We distinguish between main texts, protocols (explicitly named
in this way),20 level 1 supplementary texts (i.e., annexes or appendixes to treaties or
protocols) and level 2 supplementary texts (i.e., appendixes to annexes).
Supplementary texts may be adopted at the same time or later than the superordinate
text. The number of texts in each category of texts can be seen from table 2.









Number of texts 102 13 40 221 24
Amendment provisions differ
from those of superordinate text
(in %)
--- 100 35.0 29.7 16.7
                                                
20 The distinction between a main treaty and a protocol is often considered to be arbitrary by
international lawyers and has no legal consequences (Ipsen, 1999: 98). Usually, however,
protocols explicitly refer to an already established treaty. They may borrow their amendment
provisions from this treaty, which is why we use a separate category for protocols.
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The content analysis of the texts was based on a keyword search of terms relating to
flexibility provisions.21 The passages containing the legal provisions were then
classified according to a code book. The code book contains entries on the following
aspects: subject category according to Burhenne; year of adoption; original number of
contracting parties, if given in the treaty (used as a control variable); definite-term or
indefinite-term agreement; revision of the treaty mentioned (yes/no) and length of
period until first revision;22 amendment mentioned (yes/no); procedure for adoption of
amendment; procedure for entry into force of amendment; provisions concerning treaty
members dissenting with amendment; institutions for arbitration; bindingness of
arbitration (yes/no); scope of the arbitration procedure (complete text or parts of the
text). The code book is reproduced in the appendix to this paper.
4.1 Univariate analysis
With respect to a number of variables collected, we find that the environmental treaties
of our sample are quite similar. First, all of the treaties or supplementary texts are,
either explicitly or implicitly, unlimited in duration. Second, only 11.2 per cent of the
texts specify in advance a date for possible revision. Third, 82.5 per cent of all treaties
do not mention the original members of the treaty or limit the treaty to a particular
group of countries. Fourth, only 28 texts explicitly mention the position of signatories
which do not accept an amendment. In 21 of these cases, a provision is included
stipulating that these members must leave the treaty altogether.23 This confirms our
expectation that in public goods treaties exclusion is rarely used as a threat in order to
facilitate amendment or to ensure the uniformity of treaty texts. Finally, only 13 texts
limit the scope of the arbitration procedures to particular designated parts of the
                                                
21 Keywords referring directly to amendments were the following: amendment, modification,
alteration, change, revision and its different lexicographical modifications. As keywords referring
to arbitration, we used arbitration, tribunal, judicial, mediation, dispute, settlement, conciliation.
We also looked in the wider area of flexibility provisions using the keywords contracting out,
opt-out, annulment, termination, suspension, renunciation, withdrawal, termination of
membership, escape clause, inter-se. We used a coding procedure whereby an international law
students coded each case. After an initial instruction period, the coding proved to be reliable and
were only checked randomly by the authors.
22 In other parts of the code book, we did not distinguish between revision and amendment, since
these terms are often used synonymously.
23 These are mainly treaties establishing international organisations or regimes, such as the Antarctic
Treaty or the Convention on the International Consultative Maritime Organisation. Hence, we
find support for Amerasinghes notion (mentioned earlier) that it is essential for constitutional
treaties to ensure that the same treaty applies to all member states.
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agreement. We, therefore, limit the following investigation to three kinds of provisions
where the variation observed in the sample is greatest: adoption of amendments, their
entry into force, and procedures for dispute settlement.
Next, we investigate whether supplementary texts deviate in their flexibility provisions
from the superordinate texts. If supplementary texts only reproduced the governance
structure of the main treaty texts, it would be reasonable to limit the empirical analysis
to the latter. However, we observe from table 2 that supplementary texts quite
frequently contain amendment procedures which differ from the amendment
procedures of the superordinate text. This is most evident in the case of protocols, of
which more than a third have provisions which differ from those of the main treaty
text. Sometimes, however, this reflects the fact that the protocol is, in fact, a new
treaty, such as the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty of
1991, which was adopted over thirty years after the original treaty, or the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Others, such as the Protocol for
the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources of
1980 are more closely associated to the original treaty. Hence, there is more
heterogeneity in this group of texts than in the others.
In our data, we find a huge number of institutional variants concerning flexibility
provisions for adoption, entry into force and dispute settlement.24 There is clearly a
trade-off between preserving the richness of the institutions of the real world, on the
one hand, and the need to reduce them to a limited number of ideal typical
arrangements in order to discover regularities in their use, on the other. We solve this
problem by aggregating the institutional options into the broader categories shown in
tables 3 to 5.
                                                
24 In many cases, requirements are quite complex, for instance if a majority is defined both in terms
of the number of states as well as in their importance to the problem  such as tonnage for treaties
concerning the pollution of the sea. Other treaties, like the Antarctic Treaty, distinguish between
different groups of member states with different weights in the decision procedure. Some treaties,
especially regional ones, express the majority requirements in absolute numbers rather than
proportions.
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1 Unanimity 15.7 23.1 10.0 13.1 0.0
2 Consensus 11.8 15.4 22.5 29.0 37.5
3 Qualified majority 33.3 53.8 42.5 41.2 58.3
4 Not specified 39.2 7.7 25.0 16.7 4.1
χ²-statistic: 40.8 (p-value: 0.000)
From the first column of table 3, we observe that a third of all main treaty texts allow
for majority decision-making on amendments. In all but nine cases, this means
qualified majority voting by majorities of either two-thirds or three-quarters. About one
out of four treaties explicitly grants veto power to each member state, with the
consensus rule as a softer form of unanimity. Almost forty per cent of treaties do not
mention flexibility provisions at all or leave the amendment rule unspecified. Here, the
Vienna Convention as a fallback provides the rules for amendment, which means
unanimous decision-making.25 As far as the supplementary texts are concerned, our
tentative hypothesis is confirmed: supplementary text are generally less restrictive than
main treaty texts. According to the chi-squared statistic, the difference between main
treaty texts and supplementary texts is highly significant. Also interesting is that
supplementary texts more often contain specific amendment procedures than treaties.
This is because treaties with an array of supplementary texts are more institutionalised
entities than stand-alone treaties, and the degree of institutionalisation carries over to
the supplementary texts.
                                                
25 However, in cases of conflict the explicit definition of unanimous renegotiations may result in
lower transaction costs as compared to treaties amended in accordance with the Vienna
Convention.
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1 All have to ratify 6.9 15.4 10.0 8.6 0.0
2 A qualified majority has to
ratify
44.1 46.2 60.0 40.7 12.5
3 No ratification, but objection
is possible
2.9 15.4 2.5 17.2 70.8
4 No separate ratification
procedure
6.9 15.4 2.5 16.7 12.5
5 Not specified 39.2 7.7 25.0 16.7 4.2
χ²-statistic: 105.3 (p-value: 0.000)
Concerning provisions for entry into force (table 4), only few multilateral treaties
require all parties to ratify amendments. In all other cases, either ratification of a
majority of member states is sufficient for entry into force or entry into force of
amendments does not require formal ratification. The third row contains those cases
where the treaty enters into force automatically unless a specified number or proportion
of member states raises objections. As one would expect, ratification is more often
used for main treaty texts and protocols, while automatic entry into force is a provision
most often found in supplementary texts. In particular, the simplified procedure
whereby an amendment enters into force unless objections are raised almost becomes
the norm for level 2 supplementary texts. The fourth row contains cases where the
treaty enters into force without further conditions.26 This corresponds to
Amerasinghes one-step procedure. Overall, only a small fraction of sample texts
contain such a provision. Again, the absence of a specification for entry into force
means that the provisions of the Vienna Convention apply. Our hypotheses of
supplementary texts showing less restrictive flexibility provisions is again significantly
corroborated by the data.
                                                
26 In some cases, the amendment enters into force only for those states which do not object to being
bound by the amended treaty. In others, no objections are admissible.
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1 Binding arbitration 26.5 53.8 37.5 48.9 62.5
2 Non-binding arbitration 19.6 23.1 27.5 29.9 25.0
3 No arbitration 53.9 23.1 35.0 21.3 12.5
χ²-statistic: 41.9 (p-value: 0.000)
With regard to the provisions for dispute resolution (table 5), we distinguish between
tribunals issuing binding decisions and bodies which give recommendations only. If a
treaty contains both kinds of provisions, we code it as having binding arbitration. We
observe that more than half of the treaties do not provide for institutions for dispute
settlement at all. On the other hand, supplementary texts show significantly more
stringent dispute settlement procedures, more than half of them having binding
arbitration.
4.2 Bivariate and multivariate analysis
In the following table, we describe the most frequent combinations of flexibility
provisions. This should give a first impression on whether provisions in one category,
such as adoption provisions, are complemented by provisions in another, i.e. entry into
force or arbitration procedures. Moreover, we can verify the conjectures about
combinations of provisions derived in section 3. As an empirical basis, we consider the
full sample of 400 treaty and agreement texts.
The most frequently used combination consists in the absence of rules in all three types
of provisions we consider. This mainly concerns treaties adopted from the 1950s to the
1970s. In most cases where a majority is sufficient for adoption, we also find
provisions for binding arbitration (lines 2, 5 and 8). We interpret the existence of
binding arbitration as an ex-ante protection against profound changes in existing treaty
texts brought about by majority rule. As soon as treaty members renounce unanimity,
tribunals may be used to protect against unwanted consequences of more flexible
provisions. Conversely, there are a considerable number of cases where binding
arbitration goes together with consensus or the fallback provisions (lines 3, 6 and 15).
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In particular, the combination of binding arbitration with the default solution of the
Vienna Convention for amendment and entry into force gives arbitral tribunals
maximum power to change treaty obligations without being threatened by explicit
amendments by states. This does not give strong support to the view that states are
anxious to limit the discretionary leeway for interpretation, as argued by Cooter (2000).
Table 6: Most frequent combinations of flexibility provisions
Rank Adoption Entry into force Arbitration No. of cases
1 not specified not specified no arbitration 60
2 majority a majority ratifies binding 58
3 consensus a majority ratifies binding 31
4 consensus a majority ratifies no arbitration 23
5 majority if no objections binding 20
6 not specified not specified binding 19
7 consensus if no objections non-binding 18
8 majority one-step binding 17
9 consensus all ratify non-binding 15
10 majority if no objections no arbitration 14
11 consensus a majority ratifies non-binding 13
12 unanimity all ratify no arbitration 10
13 unanimity a majority ratifies no arbitration 10
14 not specified not specified non-binding 10
15 consensus one-step binding 10
Amerasinghes (1996: 413) conjecture according to which a majority requirement at
the adoption stage necessitates a further ratification stage is contradicted by 17 texts
which combine qualified majority voting with the one-step procedure (line 8). These
cases appear to be particularly interesting because here, a majority of treaty members
make decisions which become, without further conditions, binding on all states.
However, the one-step category comprises also the possibility that states can
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individually object to an amendment, with the consequence that the amendment does
not become binding on them, but without calling into question the legal entry into force
of the amendment.27 We found only one case among those included in line 8 where
such an opt-out provision was not included.28
The most restrictive amendment procedure from the table is contained in line 12
(unanimity, all members have to ratify, no arbitration). It applies to the following three
treaties, including their supplementary texts: the Agreed Measures for the Conservation
of Antarctic Fauna and Flora of 1964, the Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing with
Pollution of the North Sea by Oil and Other Harmful Substances of 1983 and the
Cooperation Agreement for the Protection of the Coasts and Waters of the North-East
Atlantic Against Pollution of 1990. According to our theory, these should be treaties
where sunk costs are particularly important. While this is very hard to see in the first
case, the other two treaties do contain provision which require member states to
undertake irreversible investments. The Agreement of 1983 call on states to provide
techniques to monitor oil pollution. The Cooperation Agreement of 1990 requires
states to set up and maintain in operation equipment in order to be able to deal with
discharges of hydrocarbons or other harmful substances.
In the next step, we apply correspondence analysis to describe more completely the
interaction of different flexibility provisions. The aim is to recover the dimensionality
of the data. We are interested in whether the variety of flexibility provisions and their
combinations are reducible to a common underlying property space. Correspondence
analysis is an exploratory method for finding out lower-dimensional mappings of
discrete data tables (Greenacre, 1993, Clausen, 1998, Blasius, 2001). The institutional
provisions contained in tables 3 to 5 are entered as nominal, rather than ordinal,
categories in order to preclude any arrangement of the data that should be the result of
the dimension reducing technique. The extracted spaces are defined according to a chi-
squared distance concept. We use bivariate correspondence analysis of a composed
table. The column variable is the procedure for adoption of amendments, which is
regarded as the central variable of interest since it determines whether all parties have
given their consent to amendments. The rows are formed by the procedures for entry
into force and for arbitration.29 We display combined biplots, i.e. row and column
                                                
27 See Appendix.
28 Statutes of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (as
amended), 1948.
29 This procedure is usually practised following the application in Bourdieu (1984).
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points are in a single map. Standardisation is symmetrical30. It is important to keep in
mind that even with a symmetrical standardisation one cannot, in contrast to the use of
Euclidean distance metric in factor analysis, exactly interpret distances between row
and column points, respectively, as similarities. However, it is possible to draw
conclusions from the clustering of variable values, because row points that are close to
each other can be interpreted as being similar as compared to the distribution of cases
across the columns.
Figure 1: Correspondence analysis of flexibility provisions – all texts
Turning to the results shown in figure 1, we conclude from the Eigenvalues that two
dimensions are sufficient to explain the variation in flexibility provisions. The first and
second dimensions together explain about 70 per cent of the inertia. While according to
                                                





















a chi-squared test, a third dimension would contribute significantly to the explanation
of inertia, we decided to leave it out because it contributes only four percentage points
to the total inertia explained.
The dimensions of the graph have a clear prima facie interpretation. The x-dimension,
explaining about 60 per cent of inertia and accounting for about 84 per cent of the total
inertia, can be viewed as the degree of explicit institutionalisation. Provisions to the
left of the graph are institutionalised options, while the absence of explicit provisions
is located at the right. The y-dimension, by contrast, can be interpreted as indicating the
degree of flexibility in decision-making.
The more important institutionalisation dimension extends from the implicit default
solution for adoption on the one pole (contributing the most to the inertia of this
dimension) to the group of explicit provisions on the other. The absence of provisions
for adoption or entry into force renders a treaty even less institutionalised than a treaty
which does not include a procedure for dispute settlement. The second dimension
extends from the requirement that an amendment must be ratified by all treaty
members to the majo tarian amendment rules. The result that the requirement for all
contracting parties to atify amendments is ranked as least flexible is not surprising in
the light of our a p
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Figure 2: Correspondence analysis of flexibility provisions – treaties and
protocols
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In a further step, we introduce two groups of passive variables, the year of adoption of
the text and the position of text in the hierarchy defined in tables 3 to 5. Passive
variables can be located in the same dimensions as the flexibility provision, while they
do not influence the coordinates of the active variables (see Clausen 1998, Blasius
2001).
Figure 3: Text hierarchy used as passive variable – all texts
Figure 3 shows the location of texts at different hierarchy stages in the
institutionalisation and flexibility dimensions. The positions of the different flexibility
provisions are the same as in the previous figures, with a designating an adoption
procedure, e a procedure for entry into force and t a rule on arbitration. We
observe that main treaty texts are found to be less institutionalised than supplementary
texts. This may be implied by the construction of the data: if a treaty contains
amendment procedures, they usually extend to appendixes and annexes, too. More
interesting are the differences in the flexibility dimension. If the treaty contains parts


























provisions. Supplementary texts on the first hierarchy level are not different from the
main treaty texts with respect to flexibility. However, supplementary texts on the
second hierarchy level do possess more flexible provisions.
Figure 4: Date of adoption used as passive variable – all texts
Taking the year of adoption as a passive variable (figure 4), we note that the degree of
institutionalisation has increased over time, albeit this development seems to have
come to an end in the 1980s. In the flexibility dimension, there is a marked change
between treaties adopted in the 1970s and treaties adopted after 1990. Treaties adopted
earlier show a much higher degree of flexibility, being positioned at the same y-
coordinate as the majoritarian provisions for adoption and entry into force. By contrast,
treaties from the 1990s are positioned at the same flexibility coordinate as the
consensus rule. Given that environmental treaties adopted later contain more
substantive and less symbolic content (Congleton, 1992), this finding accords well with

























serve to protect the irreversible decisions required by the treaties adopted during this
decade, while negotiators had to be less apprehensive concerning the dangers of
renegotiation in earlier periods.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analysed flexibility provisions in multilateral environmental
treaties and described their application in real world settings. Coming from a contract
theory perspective, we have stressed that the flexibility provisions included in
international treaties have economic significance. The advantage of additional
flexibility is that treaties can more easily be adapted to changes in preferences or new
scientific knowledge. The disadvantage is that, by introducing majority rules for
amendment and the like, countries risk the loss of their irreversible investments into
the treaty relationship. Therefore, they may be reluctant to enter large-scale
international commitments. The optimal amendment rule weighs advantages and
disadvantages of additional flexibility in a way that ex-ante utility of the treaty is
maximised. It depends directly on the degree to which the investment into the
contractual relationship is reversible.
In our exploratory empirical analysis, we have looked at 400 multilateral treaties and
supplementary texts from the area of international environmental politics. We note that
there are remarkable differences in the provisions for adoption and entry into force of
amendments, as well as in the existence and use of third-party arbitration. Using
correspondence analysis, we show that the provisions can be represented in two
dimensions: one is the degree of explicit institutionalisation, the other is the degree of
flexibility in collective decision making. Furthermore, it is shown that flexibility rules
complement each other. Treaties which have more flexible amendment rules are also
more likely to have binding arbitration procedures. This parallels the checks and
balances applied within nations and suggests that constitution designers care for
bounded flexibility on the international level.
Our empirical results mainly serve to establish some quantitative knowledge on
flexibility rules, which has so far not been established in the literature, while a precise
statistical test of our economic hypothesis is left to further research. Another avenue
for further research could be to extend the universe of treaties investigated. Restricting
the analysis to treaties dealing with a particular subject-matter, environmental
problems, left us with considerable variation in some provisions for renegotiation.
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However, treaties were quite similar in other respects, such as the duration or the
provisions concerning members not ratifying amendments. Our guess is that this may
have to do with the economic character of the good provided by the treaty. Techniques
such as loglinear modelling or hierarchical logistic regression models (Thurner, 1998,
2000) might be used for the statistical explanation of negotiators choice of provisions,
distinguishing between goods-induced, structure induced and institutionally induced
factors. Finally, a third interesting topic for further analysis may concern the path
dependence of the institutions under consideration.
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1. Provisions mentioning the number of parties to the treaty
AX explicit mentioning of X contracting parties
BX explicit mentioning of X contracting parties, if  accession of
further parties is arranged for in the treaty
0 contracting parties are not mentioned in the treaty
2. Provisions specifying limited duration or revision
CX revision possible on request in X years at the earliest
RX revision scheduled in X years
BX treaty is limited in duration (X years)
AX amendments are not permitted until expiration of X years
0 no revision or limitation in duration of the treaty
3. Existence of amendment provisions
1 yes
2 only in the form of a revision
0 No
4. Provisions for adoptioni
X majority requirement for approval: X per cent 3 qualified majority
B consensus 2 consensus
C unanimity 1 unanimity
D others or combinations
E no provisions for adoption 4 not specified
F adoption according to the statute of an international
organisation
G no amendments 4 not specified
5. Provisions for entry into force
Xa after ratification of X per cent of the signatories; then in force
for all states which have ratified
2 a majority ratifies
Xb after ratification of X per cent of the signatories; then in force
for all states, except those that object explicitly
2 a majority ratifies
Ya after ratification of Y signatories; then in force for all states
which have ratified
2 a majority ratifies
Yb after ratification of Y signatories; then in force for all states,
except those that explicitly object
2 a majority ratifies
A enters into force for all members without separate ratification 4 no separate procedure
B enters into force for all members without separate ratification
unless a minimum number of states objects
3 no ratification, but
objection is possible
C enters into force for all members without ratification except
for those that explicitly object
4 no separate procedure
D enters only into force if all parties ratify 1 all ratify
E other rules
F according to the statute of an international organisation





G not mentioned 5 not specified
G not mentioned 5 no amendments
H enters into force for all members without ratification except
for those objecting explicitly, unless a minimum number of
states object
3 no ratification, but
objection is possible
I enters into force for all ratifying states, without the necessity
of a minimum number
6. Outcome for parties not ratifying the amendment
0 not mentioned
1 remain bound by the original treaty
2 possibly have to leave the treaty
7. Arbitration procedureii
A permanent arbitral tribunal
B other (e.g. ad-hoc) arbitral tribunal
C conciliation or mediation commission
D International Court of Justice
E arbitration institutions of an International Organisation or
another treaty
F others, explicitly mentioned
G others, not explicitly mentioned
H no institutions for arbitration
I convention of the member states
8. Legal liability of the outcome of dispute resolution
A final and binding 1
B recommendation 2
C no dispute resolution 3




                                                
i If a treaty includes different provisions for differentiated groups of participants, only the most
restrictive provision is taken into account for the coding.
ii Multiple entries are possible during the coding procedure, for the aggregation only the arbitration
procedure with the highest degree of institutionalisation is considered.
